Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location

About the rule

Rule Type

Standard

Rule Description

Odbcconf.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used to configure ODBC drivers and data sources and is capable of loading dynamic link libraries (DLLs) for driver management. Attackers can abuse odbcconf.exe to execute malicious DLLs residing in suspicious or user-writable directories, thereby bypassing application controls or gaining persistence. This rule is designed to detect suspicious executions of odbcconf.exe that load DLLs from non-standard, untrusted, or potentially malicious locations.

Severity

Trouble

Rule journey

Attack chain scenario

Initial access → Execution (abuse of odbcconf.exe with malicious DLL) → Command and Control → Impact

Impact

• Defense evasion
• Unauthorized code execution
• Privilege escalation
• Malware deployment

Rule Requirement

Prerequisites

Use the Group Policy Management Console to audit process creation and process termination.

Install Sysmon from Microsoft Sysinternals and download the Sysmon configuration file that includes process creation monitoring. Add network connection events to the configuration file to monitor all network activity.

Create a new registry key "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" in the directory "Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\" if not already created.

Criteria

Detection

Execution Mode

realtime

Log Sources

Windows

MITRE ATT&CK

Defense Evasion: System Binary Proxy Execution - Odbcconf (T1218.008)

Security Standards

Enabling this rule will help you meet the security standard's requirement listed below:

DE.CM-01: Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events.

When this rule is triggered, you’re notified of odbcconf.exe being used to load a DLL from a suspicious or non-standard path. This enables you to examine command-line usage, verify the legitimacy and source of the DLL, and quickly identify malicious attempts to leverage signed Windows binaries for unauthorized code execution.

Author

Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

Future actions

Known False Positives

This rule may trigger during legitimate ODBC driver updates or custom enterprise deployments where DLLs are installed to unconventional but still approved locations. Careful review of installation context, directory paths, and source trust is required to rule out benign cases.

Next Steps

When this rule is triggered, the following measures can be implemented:

1. Identification: Identify if the flagged event is a new incident or part of an existing incident.
2. Analysis: Analyze the impact and extent of the incident to comprehend the severity of the attack using the Incident Workbench.
3. Response: Respond promptly by initiating an automated workflow to interrupt the network connections and cease the malicious process.
4. Reconfiguration: Update detection rules, enhance application control lists, and review allowlists/deny-lists to accommodate legitimate business use while excluding attack patterns. Continue monitoring for further anomalous behavior.

Mitigation