HackTool - ADCSPwn Execution
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In this page
Rule name | Rule type | Log sources | MITRE ATT&CK tags | Severity |
HackTool - ADCSPwn Execution | Standard | Windows | Collection: Adversary-in-the-Middle - LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001), Credential Access: Adversary-in-the-Middle - LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) | Trouble |
About the rule
Rule Type
Standard
Rule Description
ADCSPwn is a known post-exploitation and privilege escalation tool commonly used by attackers to extract credentials and compromise Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) infrastructure. While its primary function is to automate a wide range of AD CS attack techniques, attackers often execute ADCSPwn on endpoints after gaining initial access to escalate privileges, move laterally, or gain unauthorized persistent access to certificate templates and domain controllers. This rule is designed to detect the execution of ADCSPwn or its known variants such as process creation, suspicious command-line arguments, or file system activity.
Severity
Trouble
Rule journey
Attack chain scenario
Initial access → Execution of ADCSPwn → Credential theft → Lateral movement → Impact
Impact
- Escalation of privileges
- Credential theft (including domain administrator accounts)
- Certificate and Kerberos ticket forgery
- Domain persistence and long-term compromise
Rule Requirement
Prerequisites
Use the Group Policy Management Console to audit process creation and process termination.
Install Sysmon from Microsoft Sysinternals and download the Sysmon configuration file that includes process creation monitoring. Add network connection events to the configuration file to monitor all network activity.
Create a new registry key "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" in the directory "Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\" if not already created.
Criteria
Action1: actionname = "Process started" AND COMMANDLINE contains " --adcs " AND COMMANDLINE contains " --port " select Action1.HOSTNAME,Action1.MESSAGE,Action1.COMMANDLINE,Action1.FILE_NAME,Action1.PROCESSNAME,Action1.USERNAME,Action1.PARENTPROCESSNAME
Detection
Execution Mode
realtime
Log Sources
Active Directory
MITRE ATT&CK
Collection: Adversary-in-the-Middle - LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001), Credential Access: Adversary-in-the-Middle - LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001)
Security Standards
Enabling this rule will help you meet the security standard's requirement listed below:
DE.CM-01: Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events.
When this rule is triggered, you're notified of the execution or activity of ADCSPwn, enabling you to review process activity, analyze indicators of credential access, and promptly detect attempted abuses targeting Active Directory Certificate Services. This supports proactive risk monitoring and rapid investigation of privilege escalation events.
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Future actions
Known False Positives
This rule may trigger during legitimate penetration testing, red teaming, or security engineering exercises that invoke ADCSPwn or similar AD CS enumeration tools. Review user, host context, and authorized activities for legitimacy.
Next Steps
When this rule is triggered, the following measures can be implemented:
- Identification: Identify if the flagged event is a new incident or part of an existing incident.
- Analysis: Analyze the impact and extent of the incident to comprehend the severity of the attack using the Incident Workbench.
- Response: Respond promptly by initiating an automated workflow to interrupt the network connections and cease the malicious process.
- Reconfiguration: Update detection rules, refine privileged user monitoring, and enhance protections and monitoring around AD CS infrastructure.
Mitigation
Mitigation ID | Mitigation Name | Mitigation description |
M1042 |
| Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS in local computer security settings or by group policy if they are not needed within an environment. (Citation: ADSecurity Windows Secure Baseline) |
M1037 | Filter Network Traffic | Use host-based security software to block LLMNR/NetBIOS traffic. Enabling SMB Signing can stop NTLMv2 relay attacks.(Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)(Citation: Microsoft SMB Packet Signing) |
M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention | Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
M1030 | Network Segmentation | Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. This may mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of AiTM activity. |


