HackTool - Default PowerSploit/Empire Scheduled Task Creation
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In this page
Rule name | Rule type | Log sources | MITRE ATT&CK tags | Severity |
HackTool - Default PowerSploit/Empire Scheduled Task Creation | Standard | Windows | Execution: Scheduled Task/Job - Scheduled Task (T1053.005), Persistence: Scheduled Task/Job - Scheduled Task (T1053.005), Privilege Escalation: Scheduled Task/Job - Scheduled Task (T1053.005), Execution: Command and Scripting Interpreter - PowerShell (T1059.001) | Critical |
About the rule
Rule Type
Standard
Rule Description
Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
Severity
Trouble
Rule journey
Attack chain scenario
Initial compromise → Framework execution → Task creation → Alert triggered → Privilege escalation → C2 communication
Impact
- Persistent access
- Privilege escalation
- Evasion techniques
- Command execution
Rule Requirement
Prerequisites
- Using Windows event viewer:
To enable detailed process auditing with command line tracking, first log in to a domain controller using domain admin credentials. Open the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) by typing gpmc.msc in the Run dialog. You can either create a new Group Policy Object (GPO) or edit an existing one linked to the relevant organizational unit (OU). Navigate to Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Audit Policies > Detailed Tracking. Enable both Audit Process Creation and Audit Process Termination by right-clicking each, selecting Properties, choosing Configure the following audit events, and checking the Success box. To include command-line data in the logs, go to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Audit Process Creation, enable the policy Include command line in process creation events, and click OK. Finally, create the registry key "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/Operational" under *Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog* to ensure the logging channel is active.
- Using Sysmon:
To begin, download and install Sysmon from Microsoft Sysinternals and run Command Prompt as an administrator. Create or obtain a Sysmon configuration file that includes process creation monitoring, then install Sysmon using the command sysmon.exe -i [configfile.xml]. Ensure the configuration includes a <ProcessCreate> rule to capture all process creation events. Finally, if it doesn't already exist, create the registry key "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" under Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\ to enable event logging.
Criteria
Action1: actionname = "Process started" AND PARENTPROCESSNAME endswith "\powershell.exe,\pwsh.exe" AND PROCESSNAME endswith "\schtasks.exe" AND (COMMANDLINE contains "/Create" AND COMMANDLINE contains "powershell.exe -NonI" AND COMMANDLINE contains "/TN Updater /TR") AND COMMANDLINE contains "/SC ONLOGON,/SC DAILY /ST,/SC ONIDLE,/SC HOURLY" select Action1.HOSTNAME,Action1.MESSAGE,Action1.COMMANDLINE,Action1.FILE_NAME,Action1.PROCESSNAME,Action1.USERNAME,Action1.PARENTPROCESSNAME
Detection
Execution Mode
realtime
Log Sources
Windows
MITRE ATT&CK
- Execution: Scheduled Task/Job - Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
- Persistence: Scheduled Task/Job - Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
- Privilege Escalation: Scheduled Task/Job - Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
- Execution: Command and Scripting Interpreter - PowerShell (T1059.001)
Security Standards
Enabling this rule will help you meet the security standard's requirements listed below:
- NIST SP 800-53: AU-6 – Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting
Ensures that security-relevant events are reviewed and analyzed regularly.
Enabling this rule helps identify unauthorized scheduled task creation via known attack tools, enabling timely analysis and reporting of malicious activity. - NIST SP 800-53: SI-4 – System Monitoring
Requires continuous monitoring for signs of attacks and unauthorized behavior.
Triggering this rule helps by detecting Empire/PowerSploit persistence tactics, this rule supports proactive system monitoring for post-exploitation activities. - NIST SP 800-53: AC-2 – Account Management
Ensures that only authorized users and processes gain system access.
Triggering this rule helps in detecting scheduled tasks created by unauthorized scripts can indicate misuse of accounts for persistence, aiding enforcement of access control. - NIST SP 800-53: IR-5 – Incident Monitoring
Requires tools to detect and respond to security incidents.
Triggering this rule directly supports incident monitoring by flagging attacker behavior typical in post-compromise scenarios. - NIST SP 800-137: Continuous Monitoring (ISCM)
Mandates continuous assessment of security controls and risk posture.
Triggering this rule helps in continuously detecting and monitoring systems for indicators of compromise linked to known attack frameworks. - NIST SP 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
Provides guidance on detecting, analyzing, and responding to incidents.
Triggering this rule supports early detection of attacker persistence techniques, enabling timely containment and response.
Author
Markus Neis, @Karneades
Future actions
Known False Positives
This rule might be triggered when legitimate administrators use PowerShell scripts to create scheduled tasks for automation or maintenance. It can also alert during authorized testing or red team exercises using Empire or similar tools.
Next Steps
When this rule is triggered, the following measures can be implemented:
- Identification: Identify if the flagged event is a new incident or part of an existing incident.
- Analysis: Analyze the impact and extent of the incident to comprehend the severity of the attack using Incident Workbench.
- Response: Respond promptly by initiating an automated workflow to interrupt the network connections and cease the malicious process.
- Containment: Isolate the affected host from the network to prevent lateral movement and further exploitation by the attacker.
- Eradication: Remove the malicious scheduled task, disable the attacker's persistence mechanisms, and scan the system for additional backdoors or tools.
Mitigation
Mitigation IDs | Mitigation name | Description |
M1049 | Antivirus/Antimalware | Anti-virus can be used to quarantine suspicious files automatically. |
M1045 | Code Signing | Configure PowerShell to allow only the execution of digitally signed scripts. |
M1042 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program | Removing PowerShell from systems might be feasible if it's not required; but it's important to first evaluate its impact, as it may support legitimate administrative tasks. Additionally, disabling or restricting the WinRM service can help reduce the risk of PowerShell being used for remote execution. |
M1038 | Execution Prevention | Implement application control where applicable, and consider enabling PowerShell Constrained Language Mode to limit access to potentially harmful language elements—such as those used to invoke arbitrary Windows APIs or execute files (e.g., Add-Type). |
M1026 | Privileged Account Management | When PowerShell is required, consider limiting script execution to administrators by configuring the execution policy accordingly. Keep in mind that execution policies can be bypassed depending on the environment's configuration. To further enhance security, implement PowerShell Just Enough Administration (JEA) to sandbox administrative tasks and restrict the commands users or admins can run during remote PowerShell sessions. |
M1047 | Audit | Toolkits such as PowerSploit include PowerUp modules that are designed to scan systems for permission misconfigurations in scheduled tasks, which attackers can exploit to escalate privileges. |
M1028 | Operating System Configuration | Configure scheduled task settings to ensure tasks run under the context of the authenticated user rather than as SYSTEM. This can be enforced by modifying the registry key at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl, or through Group Policy: |
M1018 | User Account Management | Restrict user account privileges and address privilege escalation vectors to ensure that only authorized administrators have the ability to create scheduled tasks on remote systems. |


