How can ManageEngine support Brazil's financial institutions in meeting these standards?
With ManageEngine Log360 (SIEM), banks and other financial institutions can start aligning with the principles of BACEN 4,893/2021. See the key clauses and how our solutions help in the table below.
Chapter II, Section I - Art. 3 (II) The procedures and controls adopted to reduce the institution's vulnerability to incidents and to address other cyber security objectives
- Quarterly automated vulnerability scans on all systems
- Prioritized patch management with severity-based timelines
- Security-reviewed change management for production
- Continuous IDS/IPS for threat blocking, updated IT asset inventory
- Real-time AD change auditing detects unauthorized modifications and privilege escalation attempts instantly
- Critical group membership alerts prevent unauthorized privilege escalation to sensitive groups
- 1,000+ predefined alert profiles cover brute-force, escalation, and suspicious access without configuration
- Real-time correlation engine analyzes events identifying attack chains before exploitation
- Out-of-box correlation rules detect brute-force, escalation, and intrusion attempts automatically
- Customize alert profiles with severity classification for BACEN-specific threat scenarios
- Enable centralized eventlog collection and analysis from all end points
- Advanced correlation detects brute-force, lateral movement, privilege escalation attacks
- System event monitoring detects unexpected shutdowns, restarts, kernel security failures
- Select from 200+ predefined alert criteria for automatic security event detection
- Real-time AWS/Azure/GCP/Salesforce monitoring detects unauthorized access and anomalies
- Access predefined and customizable cloud alert profiles for vulnerability detection
- Anomaly detection identifies unusual cloud logons, data access, resource modifications
- DoS Attack Entered Defensive Mode
- DoS Attack Subsided
- DoS Attacks
- Downgrade Attacks
- Replay Attack
- Terminal Server Attacks
- Terminal Server Exceeds Maximum Logon Attempts
- IP Conflicts
- Threats Detections by ESET Endpoint Antivirus
- Threats Detections by Kaspersky
- Threats Detection by Microsoft Antimalware
- Threats Detection by Sophos Anti-Virus
- Threats Detection by Norton AntiVirus
- Infected files detected by Symantec Endpoint Protection
- Threat Detections by McAfee
- Defender Malware Detection
- Defender Real Time Protection Detection
- Anti-Malwares Updated
- Anti-Malwares Spyware Removed
- Anti-Malwares Scan
- Windows Firewall Rule Added
- Windows Firewall Rule Modified
- Windows Firewall Rule Deleted
- Windows Firewall Settings Restored
- Windows Firewall Settings Changed
- Windows Firewall Group Policy Changes
- Firewall Spoof Attack
- Firewall Internet Protocol half-scan attack
- Firewall Flood Attack
- Firewall Ping of Death Attack
- Firewall SYN Attack
- Top Vulnerable Severities (Nessus)
- Top CVS Score by Count (Nessus)
- Top Vulnerabilities (Nessus)
- Top Vulnerable Devices (Nessus)
- Top Vulnerable Service (Nessus)
- Top Vulnerable OS (Nessus)
- Top Vulnerable protocol (Nessus)
- Top Vulnerable ports (Nessus)
- Top Exploitable Vulnerabilities
- Windows Firewall Settings Have Been Changed
- Firewall IPS Signature Detected
- Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall via Registry
- Firewall Disabled via Netsh.EXE
- New Firewall Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
- Disable Windows Firewall by Registry
- Windows Defender Service Disabled - Registry
- Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope
- PowerShell Disable Security Monitoring
- Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys
- Windows Defender Exclusions Added - Registry
- Windows Defender Exclusions Added - PowerShell
- Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility
- ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
- ETW Logging Disabled For rpcrt4.dll
- ETW Logging Disabled For SCM
- ETW Trace Evasion Activity
- Disable of ETW Trace - PowerShell
- PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
- PUA - Sysinternal Tool Execution - Registry
- Potential EventLog File Location Tampering
- EventLog Query Requests By Builtin Utilities
- EventLog EVTX File Deleted
- Security Eventlog Cleared
- Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell
- PowerShell Console History Logs Deleted
- IIS WebServer Access Logs Deleted
- Tomcat WebServer Logs Deleted
- Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
- Suspicious Scheduled Tasks created during non-working hours on Windows
- Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder
- Delete Important Scheduled Task
- Delete All Scheduled Tasks
- New Root or CA or AuthRoot Certificate to Store
- New Root Certificate Installed Via CertMgr.EXE
- Ransomware detections
- Windows Backup Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
- All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
- Periodic Backup For System Registry Hives Enabled
Chapter II, Section I - Art. 3 (III) The specific controls, including those directed at information traceability, aiming to ensure the security of sensitive information
- Centralized logging for DB access/files/admin to tamper-proof repo
- UAM to record user actions with timestamps/ID
- RBAC with permission matrices and reviews
- Data classification for encryption/logging
- Quarterly access reviews to revoke outdated rights
- Real-time file server auditing tracks access, including modifications with timestamps and user
- Data classification discovers and tags PII, PCI, ePHI for targeted protection
- File integrity monitoring detects unauthorized modifications to critical system files
- Permission analysis identifies over-permissioned users and access control vulnerabilities
- Automated response blocks transfers, shuts servers, and disables accounts on threats
- USB DLP blocks/monitors unauthorized removable media data transfers
- Email DLP inspects attachments and blocks sensitive file transmission
- Printer DLP controls printing of sensitive data with activity logging
- Ransomware detection identifies abnormal file patterns before encryption spreads
- Database DML/DDL auditing captures all data modifications and schema changes
- Column-level monitoring tracks sensitive field modifications with old/new values
- User access auditing detects unauthorized database access and exfiltration attempts
- Provides permission change monitoring alerts on privilege modifications and escalations
- View real-time alerts on critical changes including mass deletion and tampering
- Access predefined audit reports on DML/DDL operations exportable for compliance
- User attribute monitoring tracks all modifications with before/after values
- Group membership changes are logged with timestamps and user identification
- Password change auditing records user and admin-initiated modifications
- Detailed audit trails show what changed, who, when, why with comparisons
- Access 200+ event-specific reports for all AD modification categories
- Consolidate audit trail across multiple AD forests and domains
- File (or) Folder Created
- File (or) Folder Deleted
- File (or) Folder Modified
- File (or) Folder Accessed
- Folder Permission Changes
- Failed attempt to Create File
- Failed attempt to Delete File
- Failed attempt to Modify File
- Failed attempt to Access File
- System File Changes
- Top FileType Changes
- Top operations - user wise report
- Top operations - host wise report
- Top operations - file wise report
- File Monitoring Overview
- File Monitoring Trend
- All File or Folder Changes (Removable Storage/USB)
- File Read
- Failed attempt to Read File
- File Created
- File Modified
- Failed attempt to Modify File
- File Deleted
- Failed attempt to Delete File
- File Deleted And Archived
- File Shredding Blocked
- File Stream Creation
- File Time Change
- Raw Access Read
- Clipboard Content Changed
- Executable File Blocked
- Registry Accessed
- Failed Registry Access
- Registry Created
- Failed Registry Creations
- Registry Value Modified
- Failed Registry Modifications
- Registry Deleted
- Failed Registry Deletions
- Registry Permission Changes
- Top Users on Registry
- Network Share Read
- Failed Network Share Read
- Network Share Permission Modified
- Network Share Added
- Network Share Modified
- Network Share Deleted
- Network Share Overview
- Network Share Object Permission Added
- Network Share Permission Deleted
- User wise top successful network shares
- User wise top failed network shares
- Remote host wise top network share access
- Top network share creations/modifications/deletions by remote host
- External Device Recognized
- Device Disabled
- Device Enabled
- Installation Forbidden By GPO
- Previously Blocked Device Installed
- Removable Device Plug in
- Removable Device Plug out
- Top Successful Users on Removable Disk Auditing
- Top Failed Users on Removable Disk Auditing
- Removable Disk Changes Trend
- Host Based Removable Disk Changes
- UAC Bypass via Event Viewer
- AD Object WriteDAC Access
- File or Folder Permissions Modifications
- Run PowerShell Script from ADS
- Unauthorized System Time Modification
- Disable of ETW Trace
- Suspicious Eventlog Clear or Configuration Using Wevtutil
- Fsutil Suspicious Invocation
- EventLog Query Requests By Builtin Utilities
- Unusual Mailbox Access
- MSQL XPCmdshell Option Change
- Computer Discovery And Export Via Get-ADComputer Cmdlet - PowerShell
- Active Directory Computers Enumeration With Get-AdComputer
- Active Directory Kerberos DLL Loaded Via Office Application
- Suspicious Bulk File Modifications or Deletions on Windows
- Automated Collection Command Prompt
- Potential EventLog File Location Tampering
- Browser Execution In Headless Mode
- PUA - SoftPerfect Netscan Execution
- Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account
- LSASS Process Reconnaissance Via Findstr.EXE
- Private Keys Reconnaissance Via CommandLine Tools
- Potential Compromise of DSRM Account
- Extracting Information with PowerShell
- Local Accounts Discovery
- Active Directory Group Enumeration With Get-AdGroup
- User Discovery And Export Via Get-ADUser Cmdlet
- Password Policy Enumerated
- Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share - PS
- PowerShell Script Change Permission Via Set-Acl - PsScript
- Sensitive File Recovery From Backup Via Wbadmin.EXE
- SAM SECURITY Hive Dump Possible Credential Theft
- Ntdsutil Abuse
- User Added to Remote Desktop Users Group
- Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Usage
- Certificate Exported Via PowerShell
- Suspicious Get-ADReplAccount
- DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction
- HackTool - DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets
- Unattend.XML File Access Attempt
- Suspicious Where Execution
- Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE
- Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM
- Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share
Chapter II, Section I - Art. 3 (IV) The record of incidents relevant to the institution's activities, as well as the analysis of their cause and impact and the control of their effects
- Centralized incident logging with date/time/systems/severity
- Formal RCA for vulnerabilities and patterns
- Timeline/impact docs (disruption, exposure, costs)
- Track control enhancements post-incident
- Quarterly trend reports for leadership
- Centralized incident repository consolidates security events into unified incident tracking
- Correlation engine analyzes event relationships and reconstructs complete attack chains
- Playbook automation triggers immediate response actions on incident detection
- Alert profiles systematically categorize incidents by type for organized tracking
- Incident Workbench correlates multi-source data for comprehensive impact analysis
- Root cause analysis through correlation reconstructs forensic timelines
- Historical event retention enables retrospective incident analysis after discovery
- Metrics tracking measures incident response effectiveness and improvement areas
- Event forensics reconstruct incident timelines showing exact attacker action sequence
- Multi-source correlation reconstructs complete attack context with evidence
- Centralized secure archival prevents attacker deletion of forensic evidence
- Pattern analysis detects brute-force, escalation, lateral movement attack patterns
- Powerful search enables rapid incident investigation and impact assessment
- Forensic reports show detailed before and after comparisons of affected objects
- Admin group tracking identifies unauthorized privilege escalation during incidents
- ML-based detection identifies insider threat and compromised account activity
- Password analysis detects compromised credentials and unauthorized changes
- IP tracking identifies geographic origin of suspicious logons
- Ransomware detection identifies abnormal file patterns enabling early containment
- Automated incident response immediately isolates infected systems from the network
- File auditing enables ransomware impact assessment and recovery scope determination
- Exfiltration detection identifies data theft via USB, email, and web channels
- Audit Events Dropped
- Eventlog Cleared
- Security Log Full
- Error in EventLog Service
- Event Logging Service Shutdown
- Security Logs Cleared
- Event Logs Cleared
- Event Logger Started
- Secure Deletion with SDelete
- Security Eventlog Cleared
- Backup Catalog Deleted
- NotPetya Ransomware Activity
- Shadow Copies Deletion Using Operating Systems Utilities
- All Events (Windows)
- Important Events (Windows)
- Failed logons due to Bad UserName
- Failed logons due to Bad Password
- Failed logons due to Account Lock
- Failed logons due to Expiry
- Failed logons during non-working hours
- Failed Interactive Logons
- Failed Remote Interactive Logons
- Failed Network Logons
- Failed Logons Overview
- Top Failed Logons by User
- Top Failed Logons by Host
- Top Failed Logons by RemoteHost
- Top Failed Logons by Domain
- Top reasons for windows logon failure
- Failed Logons Trend
- Failed Logons
- Local Logon Failures
- Interactive Logon Failure
- RADIUS Logon Failures(NPS)
- Application Errors
- Application Hanged
- Error Reporting
- Blue Screen Error(BSOD)
- System Errors
- EMET Logs
Chapter II, Section I - Art. 3 (Paragraph 1) When defining the cyber security objectives mentioned in item I, the institution must consider its capacity to prevent, detect and reduce the vulnerability to cyber incidents
- Assess and document maturity, infrastructure, and resources
- Define targeted objectives based on risk and regulations
- Set measurable KPIs like MTTD, MTTR, and vulnerability remediation rates
- Allocate resources and secure board approval
- Establish governance with clear accountability and monthly reporting
PREVENTION
- Multi-channel DLP blocks USB, email, web, printer data transfers
- Ransomware protection detects abnormal file patterns before encryption spreads
DETECTION
- Real-time alerts enable rapid response before attacks escalate
- Predefined profiles cover common attack scenarios without custom configuration
- Correlation identifies multi-step attacks missed by single-event monitoring
- ML behavioral anomaly detection identifies novel attacks through deviations
- Real-time Windows monitoring detects threats in real-time on endpoints
- Brute-force detection identifies failed attempts enabling rapid blocking
- Privilege escalation detects unauthorized elevation, indicating compromise
- Unusual logon detection identifies account compromise and unauthorized access
- Real-time cloud threat detection enables rapid incident response
- Predefined profiles for cloud threats reduce time-to-detection
- Anomaly detection identifies unusual activities in cloud environments
- Windows Updates - Downloaded
- Windows Updates - Detected
- Windows Updates - Connectivity
- Windows Updates - Availability
- Windows Updates - Installed
- Failed software installations
- Failed software installations due to privilege mismatches
- Software Installed
- Software Updated
- Software Uninstalled
- Failed Windows backup
- Successful windows backup
- Failed Windows restores
- Successful Windows restores
- System Restored
- Windows Backup and Restore (all variants)
- Update Packages Installed
- Failed hotpatching
- New Service Installed
- Service Started
- Service Paused
- Service Stopped
- Service Failed
- Successful Patch Events
- Policy Deployment Events
- Inventory Scanning Changes
- License Modifications
- Recovery Key Audit Events
- BitLocker Policy Events
- Computer Account Created
- Computer Account Modified
- Computer Account Deleted
- Computer Account Management (all variants)
- Potential RDP Exploit CVE-2019-0708
- CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation via Eventlog
- Exploited CVE-2020-10189 Zoho ManageEngine
- DNS RCE CVE-2020-1350
- Possible Common Log File System Driver CVE-2023-28252 Exploitation
- Suspicious Java Child Process Spawned via Internet Explorer
- Top Exploitable Vulnerabilities
- GHOST in Linux
- Shellshock Report
- Credential Failures Report
- Elevated Privilege Failures Report
- Registry Access Failures Report
- Admin Discovery Report
- Overall Nessus Report
- Firewall IPS Signature Detected
- Sysmon Blocked Executable
- Excessive Inbound or Outbound Connections from same Source
- Windows Firewall Settings Have Been Changed
- Disable Microsoft Defender Firewall via Registry
- Firewall Disabled via Netsh.EXE
- New Firewall Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE
- Disable Windows Firewall by Registry
- Windows Defender Service Disabled - Registry
- Disable Macro Runtime Scan Scope
- PowerShell Disable Security Monitoring
- Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys
- Windows Defender Exclusions Added - Registry
- Windows Defender Exclusions Added - PowerShell
- Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility
- ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
- ETW Logging Disabled For rpcrt4.dll
- ETW Logging Disabled For SCM
- ETW Trace Evasion Activity
- Disable of ETW Trace - PowerShell
- PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
- PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution
- Suspicious Tasklist Discovery Command
- Suspicious Bulk File Modifications or Deletions on Windows
- Automated Collection Command Prompt
- Potential EventLog File Location Tampering
- EventLog EVTX File Deleted
- Security Eventlog Cleared
- Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell
- PowerShell Console History Logs Deleted
- IIS WebServer Access Logs Deleted
- Tomcat WebServer Logs Deleted
- Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
- Suspicious Scheduled Tasks created during non-working hours on Windows
- Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Involving Temp Folder
- Delete Important Scheduled Task
- Delete All Scheduled Tasks
- New Root or CA or AuthRoot Certificate to Store
- New Root Certificate Installed Via CertMgr.EXE
- Ransomware detections
- Windows Backup Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
- All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
Chapter II, Section I - Art. 3 (Paragraph 2) The procedures and controls mentioned in item II must comprise, at least, authentication, cryptography, prevention and detection of intrusions, prevention of information leaking, performance of periodic tests and scanning to detect vulnerabilities, protection against malicious software, implementation of traceability mechanisms, control of access and segmentation of the computer network, as well as maintenance of data and information backups
- MFA on all systems (password + biometrics/token)
- AES-256 encryption + TLS 1.2+ for data
- Enterprise IDS/IPS for real-time monitoring/blocking
- DLP for outgoing data scanning
- Automated vuln scans/pen tests with remediation
CRYPTOGRAPHY
- File encryption monitoring enforces encryption for sensitive data at rest
- Encrypted communication prevents interception of security events
PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF INTRUSIONS
- Event correlation detects intrusion patterns through multi-source analysis
- Real-time alerts enable rapid response blocking before compromise
- Network log analysis detects network-level intrusion indicators
- Windows analysis detects host-level intrusion indicators on endpoints
- Lateral movement detection identifies multi-system compromise attacks
- Unusual logon detection identifies account compromise and unauthorized access
- Cloud monitoring detects cloud infrastructure intrusion and unauthorized API calls
VULNERABILITY SCANNING
- Compliance reporting enables scheduled periodic compliance assessments
- Compliance reports provide evidence of periodic security assessments
- Cloud compliance scanning identifies cloud infrastructure security misconfigurations
- Periodic assessment reports show security posture and vulnerability status
- Attack surface analyzer scans and identifies exposed assets and configuration risks to reduce your overall attack surface
TRACEBILITY
- AD change auditing tracks all modifications with before and after values
- File server auditing monitors access and modifications on file servers
- Logon/logoff auditing records sessions with source and duration
- 200+ reports enable rapid traceability documentation generation
- Multi-domain consolidation provides organization-wide administrative change tracking
- Centralized management consolidates logs from all infrastructure components
- Database auditing records all DML/DDL operations with details
- FIM tracks all critical file modifications with change tracking
- File access auditing records endpoint file system activities
- Permission tracking shows before and after values of changes
ACCESS CONTROLS
- Group membership monitoring alerts on unauthorized privilege escalation
- Permission tracking alerts on changes to sensitive resources
- Privileged user monitoring provides enhanced visibility into high-privilege operations
- File access control monitoring identifies users with file access
- Permission vulnerability identification remediates over-permissioned users
NETWORK SEGMENTATION
- Firewall analysis identifies communication patterns between network segments
- East-west monitoring detects lateral movement and breach propagation
- Network device analysis provides visibility into all network traffic
- Network log collection provides network-level visibility complementing host monitoring
- Log correlation detects network-based attacks exploiting segmentation failures
- Cloud segmentation monitoring validates AWS VPC and Azure VNet policies
- Multi-platform monitoring provides consistent segmentation across cloud providers
- Interactive Logon
- Remote Interactive Logon
- Network Logon
- Terminal Server Reconnected
- Terminal Server Disconnected
- Logons Overview
- Privilege Assigned to New Logon
- Logon Attempt Using explicit Credentials
- Top Logons by User
- Top Logons by Host
- Top Logons by RemoteHost
- Top Logons by Domain
- Logons Trend
- User Logons
- Logon Activity
- Remote Desktop Services Activity
- Terminated Users Session
- Remote Desktop Gateway
- RADIUS Logon History(NPS)
- Special Groups have been assigned to a New Logon
- User Added to Local Administrators
- Admin User Remote Logon
- Enabled User Right in AD to Control User Objects
- Interactive Logon to Server Systems
- Account Tampering - Suspicious Failed Logon Reasons
- User Account Created
- User Account Modified
- User Account Deleted
- User Account Enabled
- User Account Disabled
- Renamed User Accounts
- Unlocked User Accounts
- User Account Own Password Changes
- User Account Password Changes
- Password Set Users
- DC Credentials Validation Success
- DC Credential Validation Failure due to Bad Username
- DC Credential Validation Failure due to Bad Password
- Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) - Requested
- Successful Pre Authentication
- Windows Firewall Settings Have Been Changed
- Windows Defender Service Disabled - Registry
- Disable Windows Defender Functionalities Via Registry Keys
- Periodic Backup For System Registry Hives Enabled
- Ransomware detections
- New Root or CA or AuthRoot Certificate to Store
- Firewall IPS Signature Detected
- ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry
- PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering
- Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks
Chapter II, Section III - Art. 6 The institutions mentioned in art. 1 must establish a plan of action and response to incidents, aiming at the implementation of the cyber security policy
- Multidisciplinary response team with defined roles
- Detailed playbooks/escalation for incident types
- BC/DR procedures with RTO/RPO targets
- Communication templates/escalation chains
- Annual tabletop exercises with lessons learned
- Alert profiles enable systematic detection and categorization by incident type
- Playbook automation triggers predefined response actions immediately on detection
- Incident Workbench consolidates contextual data for comprehensive analysis
- Real-time alerting enables rapid incident response team mobilization
- Pattern correlation detects incidents, enabling early response before damage
- Alerts notify incident response teams immediately of incident requirement
- Forensics support incident investigation and post-incident analysis
- Rapid search enables quick investigation and containment decisions
- Forensic reports show detailed before and after object comparisons for investigation
- Action tracking verifies incident response execution and effectiveness
- Critical alerts enable rapid incident response team notification
- Automated response triggers containment actions on threat detection
- Ransomware isolation prevents spread through rapid automated containment
- File auditing enables ransomware scope assessment and recovery requirements
- Risk Level (Unix)
- Top Risk by Events (Unix)
- Top Risk by Host (Unix)
- Top Risk by RemoteHost (Unix)
- Risks Trend (Unix)
- Risks Overview (Unix)
- Success Events
- Information Events (Device Severity)
- Failure Events
- Warning Events (Device Severity)
- Error Events (Device Severity)
- Emergency Events (Device Severity)
- Alert Events (Device Severity)
- Critical Events (Device Severity)
- Notice Events (Device Severity)
- Debug Events (Device Severity)
- Audit Policy Changed (Windows Important Events)
- Audit Logs Cleared (Windows Important Events)
- User Account Changes (Windows Important Events)
- Locked User Accounts (Windows Important Events)
- SceCli Group Policy (Windows Important Events)
- All Events (Windows)
- Important Events (Windows)
- User Based Activity
- Weekly Report
- Hourly Report
- User Failed Logons (Unix)
- Top Risk by Events
- Top Risk by Host
- Top Risk by RemoteHost
- Risks Trend
- Risks Overview
- Process Created (Sysmon)
- Process Terminated (Sysmon)
- Remote Thread Creation (Sysmon)
- Process Access (Sysmon)
- Service State Change (Sysmon)
- Configuration Report (Sysmon)
- Noncritical (SAP)
- Severe (SAP)
Chapter III - Art. 11 The institutions mentioned in art. 1 must ensure that their policies, strategies and structures for risk management established in regulation in force, specifically regarding to the criteria for decision on the outsourcing of services, include the contracting of relevant data processing, data storage and cloud computing services, in the country or abroad
- Pre-contract vendor security due diligence
- Contractual cybersecurity clauses (controls, notifications, audits)
- Require ISO 27001/SOC 2 certifications with annual reports
- Quarterly oversight, audits, vuln scans
- On-demand audit rights and incident notification provisions
DATA PROCESS MONITORING
- Multi-platform monitoring enables tracking data handling in contracted services
- Real-time monitoring maintains visibility into contracted service operations
- Custom profiles detect data processing violating BACEN policies
- Out-of-box reports support verification of cloud service provider compliance
- Activity tracking identifies data access patterns and potential leaks
- Audit trails document all cloud infrastructure changes and configurations
VENDOR RISK MANAGEMENT
- Centralized monitoring consolidates security logs from all vendors and services
- Audit trails enable verification contracted vendors operate within requirements
- Cross-platform correlation identifies suspicious activities spanning vendor boundaries
- Set up alert profiles and configure custom alerts for third-party service events
- Azure AD tracking monitors cloud-integrated directory changes
- Permission monitoring detects unauthorized modifications in cloud systems
- Hybrid monitoring tracks activities across on-premises and cloud
- VPN Connection Status (WatchGuard)
- VPN Sessions (WatchGuard)
- VPN Connection Status (Topsec)
- VPN Sessions (Topsec)
- VPN Connection Status (Terminal)
- VPN Sessions (Terminal)
- Database Server Events
- Hyper-V Server Events - Partitions Created
- Hyper-V Server Events - Partitions Deleted
- Hyper-V Server Events - Failed Partition Creations
- Hyper-V Server Events - Hyper-V Start Events
- Hyper-V Server Events - Failed Hyper-V Launch
- Hyper-V VM Management - VM Management Service Started
- Hyper-V VM Management - VM Creation
- Hyper-V VM Management - VM Deletion
- Hyper-V VM Management - Failed VM Creations
- Cluster Created
- Cluster Destroyed
- Cluster Reconfigured
- Cluster Renamed
- Datacenter Created
- Datacenter Renamed
- Datacenter Destroyed
- Datastore Created
- Datastore Destroyed
- Datastore Renamed
- Datastore File Copied
- Datastore File Moved
- Datastore File Deleted
- Folder Created
- Folder Deleted
- Folder Renamed
- Permission Created
- Permission Removed
- Network Connection (Sysmon)
- DNS Query (Sysmon)
- Opened Connections (SonicWall)
- Closed Connections (SonicWall)
- VPC Changes (AWS)
- Network Gateway Changes (AWS)
- AWS RDS DB Snapshot Created
- AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Trust Anchor Created with External CA
- AWS S3 Bucket Server Access Logging Disabled
- AWS Config Disabling Channel/Recorder
- AWS RDS Security Group Deletion
- AWS S3 Bucket Server Access Logging Disabled
- AWS EFS File System or Mount Deleted
- AWS RDS Security Group Creation
- AWS RDS Instance or Cluster Delete
- AWS EC2 VM Export Failure
- AWS Key Pair Import Activity
- AWS Lambda Function Created or Updated
- AWS WAF Access Control List Deletion
- AWS STS Role Assumption by Service
- AWS Redshift Cluster Creation
- AWS RDS DB Instance or Cluster Restored
- AWS Systems Manager SecureString Parameter Request with Decryption Flag
- AWS EC2 Deprecated AMI Discovery
- AWS S3 Bucket Expiration Lifecycle Configuration Added
- AWS S3 Data Management Tampering
- AWS EC2 Full Network Packet Capture Detected
- AWS IAM User Addition to Group
- AWS IAM Roles Anywhere Profile Created
- AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - PsScript
- AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation
- DNS HybridConnectionManager Service Bus
- Cloudflared Quick Tunnel Execution
- Cloudflared Tunnel Execution
- Network Connection Initiated To Cloudflared Tunnels Domains
- Network Connection Initiated To BTunnels Domains
- Network Connection Initiated To Portmap.IO Domain
- Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated
- Potential MOVEit Transfer CVE-2023-34362 Exploitation - File Activity
- Potential MOVEit Transfer CVE-2023-34362 Exploitation - Dynamic Compilation Via Csc.EXE
- Visual Studio Code Tunnel Execution
- VsCode Code Tunnel Execution File Indicato
- VsCode PowerShell Profile Modification
- Visual Studio Code Tunnel Remote File Creation
- Visual Studio Code Tunnel Service Installation
- Renamed VsCode Code Tunnel Execution - File Indicator
- Suspicious File Execution From Internet Hosted WebDav Share
Conclusion
Now that you’ve explored how BACEN Resolution 4,893/2021 strengthens cybersecurity standards in Brazil’s financial sector and how Log360 helps you meet every clause, it’s time to take the next step.
Whether it’s identity governance, audit logging, threat detection, or building a compliance-ready audit trail, we’re here to guide you through it. Start a 30-day free trial to experience our solutions in your own environment, or contact us to schedule a one-on-one consultation.
Disclaimer: The information provided on this page is for general knowledge and awareness purposes only. It is not intended to serve as professional, legal, or regulatory advice. Compliance with BACEN Resolution 4,893/2021 depends on your organization’s specific environment, processes, and risk profile.
To accurately assess your compliance posture, we strongly recommend engaging a qualified consultant, compliance agency, or referring directly to the official BACEN documentation and guidelines.



