Kapeka Backdoor Execution Via RunDLL32.EXE
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In this page
Rule name | Rule type | Log sources | MITRE ATT&CK tags | Severity |
Kapeka Backdoor Execution Via RunDLL32.EXE | Standard | Windows | Defense Evasion: System Binary Proxy Execution - Rundll32 (T1218.011) | Trouble |
About the rule
Rule Type
Standard
Rule Description
Kapeka backdoor is a toolkit used for persistence, and rundll32.exe is a legitimate Windows component that runs DLL files as programs. Attackers often abuse rundll32.exe to execute malicious DLLs linked to the Kapeka backdoor to evade detection. This rule helps detect such Kapeka backdoor DLL executions via rundll32.exe.
Severity
Trouble
Rule journey
Attack chain scenario
Execution → Persistence → Defense Evasion → rundll.exe → Impact
Impact
- Persistence
- Defense evasion
- Data compromise
Rule Requirement
Prerequisites
- Windows Event Viewer
Logon to Group Policy Management Console with administrative privileges and enable auditing for process creation and termination events. For enhanced process tracking enable the inclusion of command line information in process creation events. Finally, create a new registry key "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/Operational" in the directory "Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog".
- Sysmon
Install Sysmon from Microsoft Sysinternals and download the Sysmon configuration file that includes process creation monitoring. Add process creation events to the configuration file to capture all process creations. Finally, create a registry key "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" in the directory "Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog".
(((((( PROCESSNAME ENDS_WITH ""\\rundll32.exe"" ) ) OR ((ORIGINALFILENAME = ""rundll32.exe"" )))) AND (((( COMMANDLINE CONTAINS "":\\programdata"" ) OR ( COMMANDLINE CONTAINS ""\\appdata\\local"" ) )))) AND (((( COMMANDLINE CONTAINS "".wll"" ) AND( COMMANDLINE CONTAINS ""#1"" ) AND( COMMANDLINE CONTAINS ""-d"" ) )) OR ((( COMMANDLINE CONTAINS "".wll"" ) ) AND (( COMMANDLINE ENDS_WITH ""#1"" ) ))))
This rule is triggered when the executed process is associated with the following suspicious elements:
- \\rundll32.exe/rundll32.exe: Refers to the process of file responsible for running DLLs as programs.
- :\\programdata and \\appdata\\local: Locations where malicious DLLs are stored for persistence and execution.
- .wll, #1,and -d: Refers to parameters associated with DLL executions.
Criteria
Action1: actionname = "Process started" AND (PROCESSNAME endswith "\rundll32.exe" OR ORIGINALFILENAME = "RUNDLL32.EXE") AND COMMANDLINE contains ":\ProgramData,\AppData\Local" AND ((COMMANDLINE contains ".wll" AND COMMANDLINE contains "#1" AND COMMANDLINE contains " -d") OR (COMMANDLINE contains ".wll" AND COMMANDLINE endswith "#1")) select Action1.HOSTNAME,Action1.MESSAGE,Action1.COMMANDLINE,Action1.FILE_NAME,Action1.PROCESSNAME,Action1.USERNAME,Action1.PARENTPROCESSNAME
Detection
Execution Mode
realtime
Log Sources
Windows
MITRE ATT&CK
Defense Evasion: System Binary Proxy Execution - Rundll32 (T1218.011)
Security Standards
Enabling this rule will help you meet the security standard's requirement listed below:
DE.AE-02: Potentially adverse events are analyzed to better understand associated activities.
When this rule is triggered, you're notified of DLL executions involving Kapeka backdoor malware. This enables you to identify malicious process executions in the system and detect attempts to establish persistence in the network.
Author
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
Future actions
Known False Positives
This rule might be triggered when legitimate DLL executions occur from the Program Data or Application Data folders.
Next Steps
When this rule is triggered, the following measures can be implemented:
- Identification: Identify if the flagged event is a new incident or part of an existing incident.
- Analysis: Analyze the impact and extent of the incident to comprehend the severity of the attack using the Incident Workbench.
- Response: Respond promptly by initiating an automated workflow to interrupt the network connections and cease the malicious process.
- Audit file executions: Continuously monitor DLL executions specifically from Program Data or Application Data folders as these are often abused by the Kapeka backdoor for persistence.
Mitigation
Mitigation ID | Mitigation Name | Mitigation description |
M1050 | Defend techniques to bypass application control via rundll32.exe using Attack Surface Reduction feature in Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit. |


